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Reconstructing the Responsibility To Protect 
in the Wake of Cyclones and Separatism 
Jarrod Wong* 
This Article reconceptualizes the doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P). R2P 
prondes that when a government fails to protect its citizens from genocide, ITTlr crimes, ethnic 
cleansiJJg or crimes against hwnanity ("mass atrocities'], that responsibility shills to the 
intemational co1nmllllity actiJJg through the United Nations. 
The UN's apparent failure to include natural disasters in the catalogue of harms 
potentially justifyiJJg R2P mtervention generated considerable controversy following Myanmar's 
refusal of foreign aJd following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nmgis. Those seeking to 
limit the scope of R2P considered it iJiapplicable iJJ the case of Myanmar, reading the UN s 
focus 011 mass atrocides as a conscious deci~ion to exclude natural disasters as triggers for R2P 
By contrast, suppolters of R2P looking to rely 011 the doctnne to compel MyaJm1ar to accept aJd 
have mgued that there is no meaniJJgful distinction between the faJJure to protect followiJJg 
naturd! disasters and the failure to protect from mass atrocities. 
This Article shows that the causes of the harm are irrelevant. DevelopiJJg what it labels a 
"constructive interpretation" ofR2P, the Article demonstrates that R2P applies equally to a 
state's failure to protect its population from /Jann caused by its omission to act when that 
omission constitutes a crime agaiJJst hwnanity. This thesis is adv,mced through the novel 
application of fundamental crinunal law principles to the reg1ine of international hwnan nghts, 
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and i.lJcludes a discussion of the extent to wlvch the co11cept o[cni11es agai11sr h1u11anity ca11 be 
deployed wherr tbe /Jami to a civifi811 population comes about by me.ms of in,1ction rather than 
;,ctio11. 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
On May 2, 2008, the full fury of Cyclone Nargis struck 
Myanmar, causing immense damage and human suffering, including 
an estimated death toll of 78,000 with an additional 56,000 people 
missing.' The already dire situation deteriorated further as the 
Myamnar regime trenchantly refused to allow a significant amount of 
foreign aid to reach victims. While the international community stood 
ready and literally at Myanmar's doorstep to deliver aid, its hands were 
tied as long as the government exercised its sovereign right to refuse 
entry into its territory. 
As much out of urgency as of outrage, French Foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner raised the possibility of the United Nations (U.N.) 
implementing the doctrine of the responsibility to protect in order to 
authorize the imposition of the delivery of aid notwithstanding the 
junta's resistance.2 The United Nations endorsed the groundbreaking 
doctrine of the responsibility to protect at the U.N. Sixtieth 
Anniversary World Summit in 2005 (U.N. Summit), one of the largest 
gatherings of heads of state and government in history.3 Widely 
referred to as R2P, the doctrine provides that where sovereign 
governments are manifestly failing to discharge their primary 
responsibility to protect their populations from "genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," that responsibility 
shifts to the wider international community acting through the United 
Nations.4 As conceived, R2P encompasses three distinct but related 
commitments: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, 
and the responsibility to rebuild.5 A contentious but crucial element of 
the doctrine is that it authorizes the use of force, although only as a last 
resort and then only if sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council.6 
In invoking R2P in the Myarunar crisis, Kouclmer unleashed a 
storm within a storm of debate that revolved around the seemingly 
I. Christopher Johnson , How Hard Will Neighbors Push B11n11a (Myanmar)?, 
CHRJSTIAN Sc1. MONITOR, May 20, 2008, at World 1. 
2. Sec Claudia Parsons, Hance Urges UN. Council to Act on Mya11mar Cyclone, 
REUTERS, May 7, 2008, http ://www.reuters.com/article /featuredCrisis/idUSL0781048 I. 
3. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General 011 Implementing the 
Responsibility To Protect, para . 4, delivered to the General Assembly, UN. Doc. N63 /677 
(Jan . 12, 2009) [hereinafter S-G Report on R2PJ. 
4. 2005 World Summit Outcome , G.A. Res. 60/ 1, "ii 139, U.N. Doc. AfRES/60/ 1 
(Oct . 24, 2005) [hereinafter Summit Out.come Document]. 
5. lNT'LCOlvfM' N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSllllLITYTO 
PROTECT. at XI (2001), availab!c at http://www.iciss.ca/pdl7commission-report.pdf 
[hereinafter [C[SS REPORT). 
6 Sec Summit Outcome Document, supra note 4, para. 139. 
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obvious but, as it turns out, fatally misleading question of whether R2P 
applies to natural disasters per se. Critics who opposed applying R2P 
to the Myanmar crisis noted that the doctrine was designed to address 
situations involving the perpetration of mass atrocities, like the 
genocide in Rwanda, and not natural disasters; and further that the 
United Nations had considered but rejected including natural disasters 
within the scope ofR2P. 1 In their view, the result would be to open the 
door to justifying all manner of humanitarian intervention, and thereby 
destroy the legitimacy ofR2P. 8 
In contrast, those in support of applying R2P in Myanmar 
contended that it made no moral sense to distinguish between 
withholding aid in natural disasters and refusing to help in situations of 
armed conflict when the end result was the same: serious and 
irreparable harm to the population. 9 To determine that R2P is 
inapplicable simply because a natural disaster was involved would 
effectively neuter the doctrine, and thereby reduce it to an empty 
letter.10 
However, while both sides make compelling points, the premise 
of the exchange itself is fundamentally flawed insofar as it turns on the 
concept of natural disasters. R2P applies, if at all, because of the 
state's intentional failw-e to protect its citizens from hann in the 
afiennath of the naflmli disaster, and not because of the deaths 
immediately caused by the natural disaster. In other words, if 
Myanmar could but did not prevent the continuing large-scale loss of 
life in the wake of the cyclone, then R2P is potentially applicable, 
because such deliberate inaction itself arguably amounts to a crime 
against humanity under international law. 
The debate is at once larger and more profound than an isolated 
inquiry into natw·al disasters and calls for radical reframing. 
Accordingly, this Article proposes the adoption of an alternative 
analytical framework based on what I cal I the "constructive 
interpretation" of R2P. Under this interpretation , R2P applies not just 
to a government's failure to protect its people from affirmatively 
7. See discussion 1i1m1 Part Y.A. l . 
8. See discussion infra Part Y.A. l, B; .'i<.Y: also Ramesh Thakur, To fnvoke or Not To 
Invoke R2P in Burow, HINDU, May 20, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9452749 ("(A)ny 
effort to invoke R2P formally in the Security Council [without the assent of Myamnar's Asian 
neighbors J would have the counter-productive effect of damaging R2P permanently . . .. "). 
9. See, e.g., Lloyd A.xworthy & Allan Rock, Responsibility To Prorect? Yes, GLOBE 
& MAIL, May 9, 2008, at A22 ("What is the moral distinction between closing the door of 
rescuing people from death by machete and closing the door of life-saving aid?"). 
10. Sceid. 
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perpetrated mass atrocities, but also from harm based on 0In1ss10n 
where the government's failure to act also constitutes a crime against 
humanity under international law. Thus, R2P potentially applies to the 
Myanmar crisis because when a state fails to act to secure the physical 
safety of its people in the aftermath of a natural disaster, that omission, 
if sufficiently egregious, constitutes a crime against humanity. 
Significantly, this Article will demonstrate that the constructive 
interpretation of R2P is grounded in prevailing international criminal 
jurisprudence, which has recognized that an omission may be the basis 
of a finding of a crime against humanity. There is, in other words, no 
need to sanction natural disaster situations as a new and independent 
basis for invoking R2P. Rather, natural disaster situations that warrant 
intervention already fall within a self-defined basis for the invocation 
of R2P, namely the failure of a government to protect its population 
from a crime against humanity. 
Given the fragile consensus supporting R2P, the importance of 
staying within the boundaries of the doctrine as drawn up in 2005 
cannot be overstated. Notwithstanding the endorsement of R2P at the 
U.N. Summit, developing countries continue to be deeply skeptical that 
the doctrine is merely a cover for neo-imperialism and that it exists to 
serve the hegemonic, even expansionist, ambitions of dominant world 
powers. A startling reminder that this remains very much a live issue 
came shortly on the heels of the Myanmar crisis. In August 2008, 
when Georgia sought to suppress a separatist movement in South 
Ossetia, a formerly autonomous region within Georgia, Russia 
responded with airstrikes on Georgian positions, not just in South 
Ossetia but also in Abkhazia, in the name of Russian citizens who 
lived in those regions. 11 Specifically, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov argued that Russia's use of force was an exercise of its 
responsibility to protect "the life and dignity of Russian citizens" in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 12 
11 . [NT'L C RISIS G ROUP, GE ORGIA: AVOIDTNG WAR IN Sou rn OSSET IA 3 (2004), http:// 
www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfin?id= l 548&type=pdf&l =I; J IM N ICHOL, CONGRESSIONAL 
REsEARC H SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS NO. RL346 18, R USSIA-GEO RGIA CONF LICT IN 
AUG. 2008: CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 1-7 (O ct. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crslrow/RL346 I 8.pdf 
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Interview by Minister of 
Foreign Affaires [sic] of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC, Moscow (Aug. 9, 
2008), http://www.un.int/russia/new/Ma inRoot/docs/warfare/statement090808/en2.htm 
[hereinafter Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. 
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As described in more detail below, it is uncontroversial that 
Russia's actions are indefensible under R2P.0 Among other reasons , 
the long-standing tens ion between the two countries suggests that 
Russia was acting not out of concern for civilians in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, but to intimidate the Georgian military and government and 
consolidate control over those regions.'~ Not only is R2P inapplicable 
to the Russian intervention as such, its invocation in this situation is 
positively harmful to the doctrine's development as an emerging norm 
of international law because it would bear out the very fears that 
developing countries hold regarding the potential for abuse of the 
doctrine. 15 
Because the constructive interpretation of R2P stays faithful to its 
definition, it tempers the concerns regarding abuse while providing a 
means of intervening in otherwise desperate situations involving grave 
harm by omission. '~ In keeping the focus on the issue of the 
intentional failure to act rather than natural disasters, the constructive 
interpretation also lends R2P greate r coherency and moral authority, 
yet preserves its bite. Further , as this Article will show, the safeguards 
inherent in both the definition and the mode of operation of the 
doctrine will prevent R2P from overreaching , and the resulting 
formulation of R2P, while broader, could paradoxicaUy foster greater 
support for the doctrine and secure its use in any future crisis that calls 
for it.11 
Part II explores briefly the history of R2P. Parts Ill and IV 
describe and analyze the invocation of R2P in the Georgia-Russia 
conflict and in the Myanmar crisis, respectively. Part V sets out and 
def ends the core thesis of this Article that R2P should also apply in any 
situation where the state has failed to protect its people from large-
scale serious harm based on omission and where the failure to act also 
constitutes a crime against humanity under international law. In that 
process, it make s both the legal and political case for supporting the 
constructive interpretation of R2P. Finally, this A11icle concludes by 
noting the larger implications of such an interpretation, including that 
R2P could potentially apply beyond the context of natural disasters and 
could extend, for instance, to situations involving environmental 
disasters or global pandemics. 
13. See discussion in/hi Part m. 
14. Sc-ediscussion infra Part 111. 
15. See discussion infra Part Ill . 
16. See discussion infra Part VA.2. 
J 7. See discussion infra Part VA.2 ., B 
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II. BRJEF HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESPONSIBTLITY To 
PROTECT 
A. Ongins of R2P 
225 
The doctrine of the responsibility to protect arose in the wake of 
the mass killings occurring in the last decade of the twentieth century, 
including in Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, which betrayed in 
painful detail the inadequacy of the international legal order to deal 
with imminent and then actual, continuing episodes of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing.18 Most dramatically, the international community 
simply stood by as 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi were violently massacred 
over a period of a hundred days in 1994.19 While such events aroused 
world anger and shame, "humanitarian intervention" has been 
controversial not only when it has failed to happen, but also when it 
has occurred.20 In 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces bypassed the Security 
Council and began a massive bombing campaign to prevent the 
threatened annihilation of the Albanian population in Kosovo by the 
Serbian army.21 The intervention ultimately secured the withdrawal of 
the Serbian forces, but not before intensifying the fighting on the 
ground and killing over a thousand people, five hundred of whom 
were civilians.22 
Thus, while these events galvanized support to find a reasoned 
and sanctioned means for intervening to halt future mass atrocities, the 
solution proved elusive as various groups in the international 
community differed on whether and to what extent intervention should 
be permitted: 
18. See Colin Thomas-Jensen & Julia Spiegel. Activism and Darlin:· Slowly Dn"ving 
Policy Change, 31 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 843, 847 (2008) ('The responsibility to protect 
emerged in the aftem1ath of mass atrocities in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo .... "); Ved P. 
Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under International Law: Will the UN Hwnan 
Rights Council and the Emerging New Noll/1 "Responsibility to Protect" Make a 
Difference?, 35 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 353, 365-66 (2007); Max W. Matthews. Tracking 
the Emergence ofa New lmemational Nom1: The Responsibility To Protect and the Cnsis in 
Darfur,31 B.C.INT'L&COMP.L.REv.137, 139, 144(2008). 
19. See TCISS REPORT, supra note 5, at Vil; Matthews, supra note 18, at 139; Nanda, 
supra note 18, al 365-66. 
20. JCISS REPORT, supra note 5, at I. 
21. Id 
22. lNT'LCR!MlNAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO. (JCTY): FINAL REPORTTOTHE 
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TOREVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (June 8. 2000) paras. 53, 90, repn"nted in 39 
!.L.M. 1257, 1272, 1282; see also Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air 
Campaign-The Crisis in Kosovo para. 26 (2000). http://www.hrw.org!reports/2000/nato/ 
Natbm200-0l.htm (estimating that between 489 and 528 civilians were killed during NATO's 
bombing campaign). 
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For some, the international community is not intervening enough; for 
others it is intervening much too often. For some, the only real issue is 
in ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, 
questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent 
loom much larger. For some, the new interventions herald a new world 
in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in 
a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, 
manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and hmnan rights.n 
Undeterred, Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, began pushing for the codification of a doctrine that would 
entrust the international community with the right and responsibility to 
intervene in response to a humanitarian crisis.2' In addressing the 1999 
General Assembly, he "ca lled on Member States to unite in the pursuit 
of more effective poLicies to stop organized mass murder and 
egregious violations of human right<;."25 His central idea revolved 
around the distinction between state sovereignty and indiVJdua/ 
sovereignty: 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the 
forces of globalization and international coopera tion. 
The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, 
and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty-and by this 
I mean the hwnan rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every 
individual as enshrined in our Charter-has been enhanced by a renewed 
consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her own 
destiny .... 
. . . Nothing in the Charter precludes a recognition that there are 
rights beyond borders. 26 
23. JCISS REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
24. See GARETH EVANS, UNDERSTANDING THE REsroNSlBILITY To PROTECT 37 (2008) 
("Toward the end of the 1990s, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a major attempt to 
resolve the conceptual impasse at the heart of the sovereignty-intervention debate .... "). 
25. The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the Umied M,tions in the 
Twenty-First Century, 47-48, dch'vered to the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Apr. 
3, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf (hereinafter 
Mif/enmilll1 Report] (referring to his 1999 address to the General Assembly). 
26. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report 
to General Assembly. U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999), a~11ilable at 
http://www.un.org/NewsJossg/ag/storieslstatements-search-full.asp?statlD=28; EVANS, supra 
note 24, at 37-38. Kofi Annan had articulated his argwnent earlier in an article in The 
Economistas follows: 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not least by 
the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely 
understood to be instruments at tbe service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At 
the same time individual sovereignty-by which I mean the fundamental freedom 
of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international 
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Instead of resolving the impasse, however, his comments excited yet 
more controversy.21 While Annan had sought to emphasize that any 
resulting intervention could embrace a whole gamut of responses from 
diplomacy to armed action, the latter possibility attracted 
disproportionate attention.28 The concept was met with resistance by 
states that perceived such intervention to be at best, an infringement of 
their sovereignty, and at worse, a Trojan horse that would allow for 
neo-imperialism, legitimating the invasion of the global South by 
Western powers.29 
Part of the problem lay in the fact that the debate concerning the 
use of force across borders to save civilian lives was conducted 
primarily in terms of "humanitarian intervention," a phrase much 
(mis)used since at least the nineteenth century, and thereby bogged 
down by the weight of history.30 Throughout this time, "[H]umani-
tarian interventions have often been treated as suspect because they 
may be used as mere vehicles for national aggrandizement, imposition 
of puppets in power, or for the institution of political and economic 
systems detested by the indigenous population."31 
The turning point for this extended discussion finally came about 
in 2001 with the publication of the influential report "The 
Responsibility to Protect" by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent panel 
sponsored by the Canadian Government (ICISS Report).32 
treaties- has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of 
individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever 
conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those 
who abuse them. 
Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49. 
27 . See Millennium Report, supra note 25, at 47-48 (noting the resulting furor). 
28. Seeid 
29. Seeid 
30. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5. See 
generally T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust 
Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. I (2002). 
3 1. Ocran, supra note 30, at 1. While there had been prior intervening efforts to 
recast the debate , they did not get much traction. For instance, Francis Deng, at the time the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, and his colleagues at 
the Brookings Institution espoused a conceprually distinct approach based on the notion of 
"sovereignty as responsibility," most comprehensively laid• out in his 1996 treatise titled 
"Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa." See S-G Repo11 on R2P, 
supra note 3, para . 7, n. I. 
32. ICISS REPORT, supra note 5. 
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R The Doctrine of R2P 
After a comprehensive study of the issue of humanitarian 
intervention, the ICISS Report set out a proposal that reframed the 
"right to intervene"- and therefore the hitherto intractable debate-in 
terms of the more palatable "responsibility to protect.'''3 As 
reconfigured, the concept of R2P is premised affirmatively on the 
state-centered "responsibility" of sovereignty rather than a third party's 
"right" to intervene in that state's affairs.3' Specifically, R2P asserts 
that "the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies 
with the state itself;· and that it is only when "the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert (serious harm to its population that] 
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect."' 5 
More broadly, the ICISS Report conceives of R2P as 
encompassing three responsibilities: that of preventing, reacting, and 
rebuilding.36 R2P is first and best served by a commitment to the 
prevention of "deadly conflict" at all levels of society,37 which vitally 
includes the creation and maintenance of an "early warning" system.33 
In the absence or failure of such preventive efforts, and where the state 
is unable or unwilling to protect its people, the international 
community must then bear the responsibility to react in the face of 
compelling need for human protection.39 The ensuing response may 
take the form of coercive political, economic, or judicial measures, and 
in extreme cases, can even include military action.'1° Finally, where 
there has been a military intervention, the international community 
would also bear the responsibility to rebuild a durable peace, 
promoting good governance and sustainable development in the 
process.41 
Sigruficantly, the ICISS Report emphasizes that in discharging 
the responsibility to react , the international community must consider 
the full range of responsive measures available, starting with the least 
intrusive and coercive measures and ratcheting them up only as 
33. Id 
34. Id 
35. Id at XJ. 
36. Id.; seealroMatthews, supmnote 18, at 140-43. 
37. lClSS REPORT, supra note 5, at XL 19 (''Prevention is the single mosr important 
dimension of the responsibility to protect .... "). 
38. Id at 21-23. 
39. Id at 29. 
40. Id 
41. Id at 39. 
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needed.42 Consistent with this princip le, military intervention should 
be considered only in extreme cases and as a last resort. 43 Specifica lly, 
the ICISS Report proposes that the use of force be j ustified under R2P 
only when six criteria are met: (1) just cause: a situation that entails 
serious and irreparable harm in the form of a "'large scale loss of life" 
or "large scale 'ethnic cleansing,"' (2) right intention: a good faith 
desire to alleviate human suffering; (3) force as a last resort: the 
exhaustion of all peacefu l and diplomatic processes before military 
force is used; (4) proportiona l means: the use at all times of the 
minimum amount of force necessary to achieve objectives; 
(5) reasonable chance of success: the intervention is not likely to make 
things worse than they were; and ( 6) right authority: prior approval 
from the Security Counci l with the understan ding that each Permanent 
Five member will agree not to use its veto where its vita l interests are 
not involved; or failing such approval, the emergency consideration of 
the matter by the General Assemb ly under the "Uniting for Peace" 
procedure or action by the relevant regiona l or sub-regional 
organization under Chapter VII of the Charter and subject to their 
seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.'" 
C The Endorsement of R2P by the UN 
Two years after the publication of the ICISS Report, and in the 
lead-up to the U.N. Sununit in 2005, Kofi Annan, as U.N. Secretary-
General, established a High-Level Panel to "recommend clear and 
practical measures for ensuring effective collect ive action, based upon 
a rigorous analys is of future threats to peace and security."45 While the 
resulting 2004 High-Level Panel Report was far broader in scope than 
the ICISS Report, the former gave its seal of approval to many of the 
core principles expressed in the latter with respect to R2P, noting that 
"[t]he Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective 
international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security 
Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of 
genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
42. fd. at 29-30. 
43. fd. at 29-32. 
44 . Id ai XII, 32-37, 47-55. 
45. See EV.A.NS, supra note 24, at 44 (quoting High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges. & Change. A More Secure World· Our Shared Respoilsibility(2004), available 
,?twww.un.org/secureworld). 
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violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have 
proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.'"'6 
In his own report, which was distributed in March 2005 to the General 
Assembly prior to and in anticipation of the U.N. Summit later that 
year, Kofi Annan incorporated all of the High-Level Panel Report's 
recommendations on R2P.47 
What followed were months of back-door wrangling in New 
York, and while the U.N. Summit- billed as the largest gathering of 
world leaders in history involving as it did some 150 heads of state and 
government- ultimately proved to be a disappointment to those 
seeking an overhaul of the U.N. system, it did result in the 
endorsement of R2P.48 The Summit Outcome Document 's articulation 
of the doctrine, however, spanned just two paragraphs and did not 
otherwise incorporate the ICISS Report: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VI n of the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, 'We are prepared 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
Vil, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperntion with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
46. Sec id at 45 (quoting High-Level Panel on Threats , Challenges, & Change, supra 
note 45). 
47. See id ; The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All, ii 135, delivered to the General Assembly , U.N. Doc. 
N 59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (hereinafter in larger Freedom]. 
48 . See Jo Larger Freedom, supmnote47 , 135. 
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international law. We also intend to commit ourselves. as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
hwnanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.49 
As a result, it is not entirely clear to what extent, if any, the 
United Nations' R2P doctrine incorporates issues discussed in the 
ICISS Report with which it is not inconsistent. Significantly for our 
purposes, while the ICISS Report explicitly applies R2P to natural 
disaster situations,5° the United Nations resolution speaks only in 
limited terms about the responsibility to protect against "genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."51 Additionally, 
the Summit Outcome Document provides no guidance on the 
threshold criteria for military intervention beyond citing the need to 
first seek resolution through peaceful and diplomatic means.52 It does, 
however, contemplate the possibility of the use of force under R2P, but 
only if sanctioned by the Security Council.53 
Following the UN. Summit, the Security Council in April 2006 
officially endorsed R2P by passing Resolution 1674, which 
"[r]eaffirms the provisions ... of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."54 
D The Current Status of R2P and Its Application in Da.rfiJ.r 
While R2P has succeeded in moving the debate on civilian 
protection beyond the impasse of humanitarian intervention, the 
underlying tension between state sovereignty and R2P nonetheless 
remains, particularly when the latter calls for military intervention. 
Any resistance to R2P on that ground is further compounded by the 
conspicuous lack of guidance on the issue in the Summit Outcome 
Document, in stark contrast to the ICISS Report. Perhaps not 
49. Summit Outcome Document , supra note 4, paras . I 38-39. 
50 . Thakur, supra note 8 ("[W]e cannot ignore the significance of the exclusion of 
natural and environmental disasters .... "); see also discussion infra Part VA. I. Compare 
ICISS REPORT, supra note 5, para . 4 .20 (defining its version of R2P as applicable to 
"overw helmin g natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either 
unwillin g or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and Significant loss of life is occurring or 
threatened"), with Summit Outcome Document , supra note 4. ,Ml 138-139 . 
51. Surrunit Outcome Document, supra note 4, 139. 
52. See 1d 
53. Sce,d 
54. S.C. Res. 1674, para. 4 , U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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surprisingly, the resulting uncertainty about its implementation has 
translated into a tentativeness on the ground, at least in the case of the 
persisting humanitarian crisis in Darfur, which is widely seen as the 
test case for the international community's acceptance of R2P.55 
Since 2003, the Sudanese government bas backed an armed 
militia-the Janjaweed-in a systematic and brutal campaign against 
the people of Darfur, a region in Western Sudan.56 The conflict is 
rooted in a longstanding dispute over resources between the region's 
farmers and herders/7 and more immediately grew out of the 
opposition of rebel groups, notably the Sudan Liberation Army and the 
Justice and Equality Movement, to the Sudanese government for its 
perceived political marginalization of non-Arabs in Darfur.5K In 
response, the Sudanese armed forces and the Janjaweed, a 
government-supported militia made up primarily of fighters of Arab 
descent, have attacked the civilian population in Darfur for allegedly 
aiding the rebels.59 
That the actions of the Sudanese forces and the Janjaweed 
amount to mass atrocities and thus fall within the scope of R2P is 
clear. The catalog of crimes perpetrated against the people of Darfur 
include "the bulldozing and burning of villages, arrests and 
extrajudicial execution, kidnapping, torture, and rape.',60 To date, 
several hundred thousand people have been killed or badly injured.~' 
Additionally, the conflict has displaced some 2.7 million people,62 
many of whom live in refugee camps in neighboring Chad, and more 
than 3.5 million people are reliant on international aid for survival.61 
Further, notwithstanding the signing of a series of ceasefire and peace 
agreements, there has been an increase in violence in the region, 
55. Sec, e.g., Enuna Mcclean, The Responsibility To P1-otect: The Role of 
International Human Rights Law, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURJTY L. 123, 142 (2008) ("[T)he 
situation in Darfur, in particular the responses of the UN and the AU, is often cited in the 
literature as the liunus test for the responsibility to protect framework."); Irene Khan, Kenneth 
Roth & Gareth Evans, Joint Letter to the U.N. Security Council (May 24, 2006), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/05/25/sudanl3462.hnn; Matthews, supm note 18, at 144. 
56. Human Rights First, About the Crisis, http://www.hiur.anrightsfirst.org/ 
intemationaljustice/darfur/about/background.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
57. See1d ; Matthews, supra note 18, at 144. 




62. The Secretary-General, Report of tbc Secretary-General on the Deployment of 
the Afiican Union-United Nations Hybrid Operauon in DarliJr, para. 48, delivered to the 
Secun'ty Counc11, U.N. Doc. S/2009/83 (Feb. l 0, 2009). 
63. Human Rights First, supra note 56. 
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including credible allegations of torture and attacks on civilians by 
signatories and nonsignatories alike.64 In short , the crisis continues 
unabated, even though the Security Council has repeatedly invoked 
R2P in this situation. 
Even before the UN. Summit, the Security Council had sought to 
resolve the Darfur conflict, having created the United Nations Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS) to work with the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), which had been created in turn by the Afiican Union (AU) for 
the primary purpose of establishing peace in Darfur.65 Following its 
general endorsement of R2P in Resolution 1674 in April 2006,66 the 
Security Council invoked the doctrine for the first time on May 16, 
2006, by passing Resolution 1679.67 Resolution 1679, which explicitly 
recalled Resolution 1674, called for the transition of military 
operations from AMIS to UNMIS, 68 which had become necessary once 
AMIS proved unable to contain the violent situation due to a lack of 
resources and manpower.69 Resolution 1679 was followed three 
months later by Resolution 1706, which also specifically recalled 
Resolution 1674 in detailing the nature of the UN. force replacing 
AMIS,10 thereby constituting the second invocation by the Security 
Council ofR2P regarding Darfur. 
The transition, however, was conditioned on the consent of the 
Sudanese government, which quickly rejected the proposal to deploy 
UN. forces in Darfur. Almost an entire year went by before the UN . 
Security Council issued another resolution on April 30, 2007, 
Resolution 1755, in which the Council reaffirmed R2P in extending 
the mandate of UNMIS, although this brought it no closer to securing 
consent from Sudan.71 It was not until July 2007 that Sudan relented, 
and the UN. Security Council passed resolution 1769 authorizing the 
deployment of a 26,000-strong joint "AU/UN Hybrid operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID)." 12 In 2008, the UN. Security Council passed 
Resolutions 1812 and 1828, extending the mandate of UNMIS and 
64. See U.N. Mission in the Sudan, Background, http ://www.un.org/depts/dpko/ 
missions/unmis/background.htrnl (last visited Sept. I 0, 2009). 
65. See Henri Boshoff, The Afhcan Union Mission in Sudan, AFR. SECURITY REv., 
2005, at 57. 
66. See S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
67. SeeS.C. Res. 1679, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006). 
68. Seekl. 
69. See Khan et al., supmnote 55. 
70. S.C. Res. 1706, pmbl., paras. 1-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) . 
71. S.C. Res. 1755, pmbl., para. 1, UN. Doc. S/RES/1755 (Apr. 30, 2007). 
72. See S.C. Res. 1769, pmbl. , paras. 1-2, UN. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
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UNA.MID respectively, both of which reiterated a commitment to 
R2P.7J 
No sooner had the Council passed these resolutions, the Sudanese 
government began to obstruct the deployment of UNA.MID troops by: 
( 1) failing to approve formally the list of UNAMID troop pledges for 
more than two months; (2) refusing contributions of non-African troop 
units from Nepa l, Thailand, and Nordic countries; (3) failing to provide 
land for bases; (4) inserting unreasonable standards in the "Status of 
Forces Agreement," which governs the relationship between the United 
Nations and Sudan; (5) refusing to grant permission for UNAMID 
forces to fly at night; (6) imposing curfews on peacekeepers in certain 
areas; and (7) objecting to the change from African Union green berets 
and helmets to the blue berets and helmets of the United Nations. 14 
The result, as the Deputy Permanent U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, Alejandro Wolff, remarked at the UN. Security Council 
meeting leading to Resolution 1828 (2008), was that 
one year after the adoption of resolution 1769 (2007), UNAMID has 
barely begun to complete its vital mission. Deployment now stands at 
just over 9,000 troops and police officers - not even half of authorized 
levels. UNAMID's slow deployment is serious ly interfering with its 
ability to protect itself and to fulfil its mandate in Darfur. The Security 
Council has sought to end the suffering of the people of Darfur, but we 
have fallen far short of our responsibility to protect them.15 
Although the consistent reference to R2P in these UN. Security 
Collllcil resolutions on Darfur potentially bolsters the status of R2P as 
an emerging norm of international law, the painful reality of its 
ineffectual implementation also highlights the vulnerability of the 
doctrine at this early stage of its development. Notwithstanding the 
multiplicity of resolutions invoking R2P, egregious human rights 
abuses that fall squarely within the scope of the doctrine continue in 
Darfur, and what UN. action there has been has simply failed to halt 
the killing.16 Under these circumstances, there is the very reaJ danger 
73. Sec S.C. Res. 1812, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1812 (Apr. 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1828, pmbl., para. I, UN. Doc. SIRES/ 1828 (July 31, 2008). 
74. See FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE C:HOMME (FIDH) , 
UNAMlD DEPLOYM!Wr ON THE BRINK: THE ROAD TO SECURITY IN DARFUR BLOCKED BY 
GOVERNMENT OBSTRUCTIONS 1-2 (Dec. 2007), aw/able at http://www.fidh.org/lMG/pdf/ 
unamid I 207web.pdf: Warren Hoge, UN Ptlacekeeping CmefSays Darfur Wssion ls ar Risk, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A6. 
75. U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5947th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc . S/PV.5947 (July 31, 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
76. See Thomas G. Weiss, !UP Afler 9/1 I and the World Summit, 24 Wis . INT'L L.J. 
741, 759 (2006) (asserting that the situation in Darfur substantiates author's argwnent that 
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that R2P, instead of serv.ing as the clarion call to the international 
community to protect civilians from mass atrocities, will be reduced to 
a mere slogan for relegation to the realm of historical curiosities of 
international law.11 As a recent 2009 report by the U.N. Secretary-
Genera] on R2P acknowledged, "Most visibly and tragically, the 
international community's failure to stem the mass violence and 
displacements in Darfur ... has undermined public confidence in the 
United Nations and our collective espousal of the principles relating to 
the responsibility to protect."78 
The 2009 report was generated in response to paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the Summit Outcome Document, heeding their call to "the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the [principle of the J 
responsibility to protect"19 in order to operationalize R2P.80 The report 
outlines a three-pillar strategy for advancing the R2P agenda that 
focuses on the general protection responsibilities of the State (pillar I), 
international community assistance and capacity-building (pillar II) , 
and the specific responsibility of states to mount a timely and decisive 
response where appropriate (pillar ill). 81 
The strategy stresses the value of prevention and, when it fails, of 
early and flexible response tailored to the specific circumstances of 
each case. There is no set sequence to be followed from one pillar to 
another, nor is it assumed that one is more important than another. Like 
any other edifice, the structure of the responsibility to protect relies on 
the equal size, strength and viability of each of its supporting pillars. 
The report also provides examples of policies and practices that are 
contributing, or could conttibute, to the advancement of goals relating 
to the responsibility to protect under each of the pillars.81 
The report thus seeks to give content to the broad mandate of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 and takes a positive, if small step, towards 
operationalizing R2P. 
The difficulty of implementation is not, however, the only 
controversy surrounding the doctrine. Two similarly cataclysmic 
events took place in 2008 that called into question the proper scope of 
global divisions about the propriety of intervention have not been resolved, precluding the 
effective use ofR2 P). 
77. See gene.nil&'Thakur, supro note 8 (stating R2P risks are being diminished by 
underuse in the case of genuine human suffering). 
78. S-G Repon on R2P, supra note 3, para. 60. 
79. Summit Outcome Document, supra note 4, 1139. 
80. S-G Rcpon on R2P, supra note 3, § I. 
81. Id 
82. Id at 2. 
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R2P: the Georgia-Russia conflict over South Ossetia and the arrival of 
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. While the debate about R2P in the 
Darfur crisis centered on the translation of principle into action-there 
being no question that the principle applied on all fours to the 
situation-these two events in 2008 brought into focus the separate 
question of when and under what circumstances the responsibility to 
protect is triggered, if at all. This Article will explore this question 
below as it addresses in turn the issues surrounding the invocation of 
R2P in the Georgia-Russia conflict and in the Myanmar crisis. 
Ill. THE !NYOCATION OF R2P IN THE GEORGIA-RUSSIA CONFLICT 
R2P is not only at risk of diminishment from underuse in 
situations of genuine human suffering that warrant its application, but 
also, as Russia's attempted reliance on R2P to justify its military 
actions in Georgia reflects, from its arrogation to serve the illegitimate 
expansionist ambitions of stronger powers. As the discussion below 
makes clear, there is little doubt that Russia's invocation of R2P is 
misplaced and, if nothing else, serves as a cautionary reminder that the 
old deep-seated tension between the concept of "humanitarian 
intervention" and the idea of state sovereignty lurks just beneath the 
surface of R2P and could well upend the doctrine if such misguided 
efforts are not swiftly and categorically rebuffed. 
A. Bnef History of the Georgia-Russia Conflict 
The relationship between modern-day Georgia and South Ossetia 
has long been strained over the latter's ambitions of independence. 
Their uneasy alliance dates back to the early part of the twentieth 
century and continued after the Red Army made South Ossetia an 
autonomous region of Soviet Georgia in 192 l .83 More recently, after 
Georgia declared its own independence from the Soviet Union in 
1990, Georgian President Gamsakhurdia repressed South Ossetian 
efforts to join Russia, trigge1ing conflict that led to an estimated 2000 
to 4000 deaths and displaced people in the tens of thousands .84 
Following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1992, the Russian Federation 
threatened to allow South Ossetia to reunite with North Ossetia if any 
civilians were killed in South Ossetia. Russia later negotiated a 
83. lNT'L CRJSIS GROUP, supnrnote 11, at2-3; NICHOL, supra note 11, at I. 
84. NICHOL, supra note 11, at 2-3; Roy Allison, Russia Reswgent? Moscow's 
Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace, ' 84 INT'LAFF. 1145, 1146 (2008). 
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ceasefire, however, which created a joint peacekeeping operation with 
joint Russian-Ossetian-Georgian patrols.ss 
Although Georgia and South Ossetia subsequently experienced a 
period of relative peace, Russia began on the quiet to distribute 
passports to many South Ossetians and Abkhazians, and in 2001, 
Eduard Kokoiti, a Russian citizen of South Ossetian origin, was 
elected president of South Ossetia.86 As a result of these events, 
Georgia "believed Russia to be pursuing a process of de facto 
absorption of South Ossetia (and also the region of Abkhazia, through 
parallel processes) into Russia.'.s7 
Shortly after Georgians elected President Mikheil Saakashvili in 
2004 following the "Rose Revolution," Saakashvili increased Georgian 
troops in South Ossetia consistent with his pledge to tighten control 
over the separatist regions of Georgia. 88 This provoked an armed 
conflict that regained no territory and greatly damaged relations with 
South Ossetia.89 Saakashvili 's subsequent attempt to reach a peace 
agreement with South Ossetia was soundly rejected by South 
Ossetians who voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence in a 
referendum put to them in 2006.90 Another attempt at peace 
negotiations fell apart in 2007.91 
Tensions increased again sharply in 2008 when shortly after 
Kosovo's declaration of independence, in February, Russia strengthened 
its support for de facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by 
withdrawing from sanctions imposed on the two separatist regions by 
neighboring states and increasing troops in the region.92 In April, a 
Russian presidential decree established direct official Russian relations 
with the South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities.93 Also that month, 
NATO convened to consider the eligibility of Georgia and Ukraine for 
85. Allison, supra note 84, at 1146. 
86. Id at 1147. 
87. Id 
88. NICHOL, supra note 11, at 3. 
89. See INT'L CRJSIS GROUP, supra note 11, at 11-16. 
90 . NICHOL, supra note 11, at 3. The separatists reported that ninety-five percent of 
55,000 registered voters turned out and that ninety-nine percent approved the referendum. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the U.S. State Department, 
however, declined to recognize these votes. In "alternative" voting among ethnic Georgians 
in South Ossetia, a referendum was approved supporting Georgia's territorial integrity 
instead . Id 
91. Id at 3-4. , 
92. INT'L CRJSIS GROUP, RUSSIA VS GEORGIA: THE FALLOUT 8 (Aug. 22, 2008), 
http ://www.crisisgroup .org/library/docurnents/europe /caucuses/195_russia_ vs_georgia_the 
_fallout.pdf. 
93. Allison, supra note 84, at 1147. 
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Membership Action Plan (MAP) status, the first formal step in joining 
NAT0.94 Although Georgia did not receive MAP status in April, the 
United States, its most powerful NATO supporter, "negotiated an 
outcome document that promised 'that [Georgia and Ukraine would] 
become members of NATO' at some time in the future."~ 
In July 2008, Russia conducted military exercises involving more 
than 8000 troops near the border with Georgia.96 At the same time, 
Russian officers hired Ossetians to help construct local military 
buildings and sent railway workers into Abkhazia to restore a broken 
link between Russia and Georgia.97 On July 8, Russian military planes 
flew over South Ossetian airspace. Russia cJaimed it had discouraged 
Georgia from an imminent attack on South Ossetia, but Georgia 
denounced the flights as violating its territorial integrity.98 On July 30, 
both sides again exchanged artillery fire, following a bombing of 
Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, several days earlier.99 On 
August 1, a roadside bomb just outside the city injured five Georgian 
police, which triggered serious fighting over the next three days.100 
On August 8, in response to South Ossetian militias' continued 
shelling of Georgian villages, Georgian troops advanced on and 
shelled Tskhinvali, taking control of most of the city and several 
Ossetian villages. The Georgian air force also started to bomb the 
Russian tanks that had begun to cross into Georgia, but the Russians 
eventually forced the Georgian military to withdraw its troops from 
South Ossetia on August 11. On August 12, mediation by French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, also the president of the European Union, 
produced a six-point ceasefire agreement that was signed on August 
15 and 16.'01 
On August 25, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declared that 
"humanitarianism" led him to recognize the independence of the 
separatist regions. 102 The United States and the international 
community, however, roundly condemned this recognition. On 
September 8, President Sarkozy negotiated a follow-on agreement that 
resulted in the deployment of over 200 EU observers to the conflict 
94. /dat I 165. 
95. INT'LC RISIS GROUP, supronote 92, at 11. 
96. NICHOL, supra note 11, at 4. 
97. INT' L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 92, at 2. 
98. NICHOL, supra note 11, at 4. 
99. Id. at 5. 
100. Id. 
IOI. INT' LC RISIS GROUP, supra note 92, at 3. 
102. N1CHOL,supranote ll,at9 . 
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zone, and even more importantly, in the withdrawal of Russian forces 
from areas adjacent to the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
October.10' 
The account above is derived primarily from Jim Nichol 's 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on the conflict, 
as well as the International Crisis Group Europe Report. While it is 
verified by other sources,104 the New 'York nmes notes, "It is very 
difficult to parse the competing narratives . . . . Both sides are now 
seeking to take the other to the International Criminal Court over 
allegations of genocide or ethnic cleansing. For the moment, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to assume that such claims constitute hyperbole 
and propaganda."105 Both Russian and Georgian officials have accused 
each other of genocide and ethnic cleansing as a means of justifying 
their actions in the conflict. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
introduced the term genocide to describe Georgian aggression, 
claiming that it had resulted in 1500 to 2000 deaths.106 In front of the 
U.N. General Assembly in September, Georgian President Saakashvili 
described the actions of Russian and Ossetian militias as ethnic 
cleansing.101 As of August 10, however, Human Rights Watch 
documented less than 100 civilian deaths.108 
On August 12, Georgia filed a case against Russia, which was 
heard by the International Court of Justice (IC]) in September, for 
alleged acts of ethnic cleansing and other crimes.109 After an 
investigation, the ICJ issued "provisional measures" on October 15 to 
both Russia and Georgia to cease and desist ethnic discrimination.110 
In the meantime, Human Rights Watch concluded that both countries 
were at fault; Georgia had used "indiscriminate and disproportionate 
force resulting in civilian deaths in South Ossetia" during the conflict, 
and "the Russian military subsequently used 'indiscriminate force' in 
103. Idat9-IO. 
I 04. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 84, at 1147; NICHOL, supra note I I, at 4. 
105. Clifford J. Levy & James Traub, Q& A on Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008 /07 I 14/world/europe/ I 2georgiaqanda.html?pagewanted =al I. 
I 06. lNT'L CRlSIS GROUP, supra note 92, at 2. 
107. Statement by H.E. Mr. Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia, The General 
Debate of the 63d Session of the UN General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.un.org/ 
ga/63/generaldebate /pdf/georgia_en.pdf. 
l 08. INT'L CRlSIS GROUP, supra note 92, at 2-3. On September 3, the Russian 
prosecutor general's office reported 134 civilian deaths in South Ossetia, and the death of 
fifty-nine Russian soldiers. On September 15, the Georgian government reported 372 
citizens dead, including 168 military personnel, 18'8 civilians and sixteen policemen. 
NICHOL, supra note 11, at 15. 
109. NICHOL, supra note 11, at 16. 
110. Id 
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South Ossetia" and parts of Georgia and targeted convoys of civilians 
trying to flee. 111 
B The Unjustified Invocation of R2P 
On August 9, 2008, even as Russian forces were crossing over 
into Georgia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made the 
argument that the Russ ian Federation's use of military force was an 
exercise of its responsibi lity to protect Russian citizens in Georgia. 
Lavrov stated the following during an interv iew with the BBC: 
My President yesterday was very clear. He said that W1der the 
Constitution he is obliged to protect the life and dignity of Russian 
citizens, especially when they find themselves in the armed conflict. 
And today he reiterated that the peace enforcement operation enforcing 
peace on one of the parties which violated its own obligations would 
continue until we achieve the results. According to our Constitution 
there is also responsibility to protect- the term which is very widely 
used in the UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in any 
remote part of other regions. But this is not Africa to us, this is next 
door. This is the area, where Russian citizens live. So the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Russian Federation make it 
absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility to protect.112 
There is little question that Russia's reliance on R2P is serious ly 
misplaced for a number of reasons. First, Russia did not claim it was 
acting on beha lf of Russian citizens within its borders, but only outside 
it and therefore also outside the scope of R2P.113 While the R2P 
doctrine does not explicitly confine its applicat ion within the relevant 
state's borders, that it does so derives from the conception of R2P as a 
means of justifying, w1der limited circumstances, outside incurs ion 
onto sovereign soil where the relevant sovereign has failed to protect 
its people 011 its om1 soil Thus, R2P was designed to correct 
situations like the genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica, that is, those 
that involved the failure of the government to protect its population 
111. Id at 16-17. A World Bank report in October stated that 127,000 people had 
been displaced from their homes during the fighting, and that 68,000 of those people had 
since returned to their homes. Id at 15-16. Another 34,000 people were in need ofshort-
tem1 housing, and 30,000 more needed long-term housing because their homes were 
destroyed. Id 
112. Ministry ofForeign Affairs, supra note 12. 
113. See Global Centre for the Responsibility To Protect , The Georgia-Russia Crisis 
and the Responsibility To Protect: Background Note (2008), http ://globalr2p .org/pdf/ 
related/GeorgiaRussia.pdf (noting mat that the protection of Russian citizens abroad is 
beyond the scope of the R2P nom1 since it does not apply to a country protecting its nationals 
outside of its own borders). 
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from the commission of mass atrocities within its borders. Russia 
improperly turns this on its head by suggesting that R2P applies to the 
protection of its nationals outside its borders. Indeed, such actions 
have historically been justified under the conceptually distinct notion 
of self-defense.114 
Additionally, even if R2P could be applied extraterritorially as 
such, or if Russia argued it was acting because of Georgia's failure to 
protect Georgian citizens within Georgia's borders-the latter a more 
coherent argument but one that Russia ironically could not make on 
account of its ambitions effectively to annex South Ossetia-it is not at 
all clear that Georgia committed mass atrocities in fighting an armed 
South Ossetian militia, which must be found to justify the invocation 
of R2P. It is likewise unclear that military intervention by Russia was 
used as a last resort and that more peaceable methods of resolving the 
dispute were unavailable to Russia. This all further assumes that 
Russia can act unilaterally under R2P, which is eminently not the case 
as articulated in the Summit Outcome Document. 
Perhaps most troublingly, there is considerable doubt as to 
Russia's true intentions. Certainly, as the historical record sketched out 
above reflects, the long-standing tension between the two countries 
subsequent to the breakup of the Soviet Union suggests that other 
equally if not more plausible rationales include intimidating the 
Georgian military and government, undercutting Georgia's efforts to 
join NATO, and consolidating control over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Indeed, not only is R2P inapplicable to the Russian 
intervention as such, its invocation in that situation is positively 
harmful to its development as an emerging norm of international law. 
R2P represents the culmination of a long journey that has been beset 
by a number of obstacles, including the tortured history of the concept 
of humanitarian intervention and the skepticism of developing 
countries of its use by dominant world powers to serve their 
hegemonic, if not expansionist, ambitions. This could well come back 
to haunt R2P if the same potential for abuse here is not swiftly dealt 
with by a categorical rejection of Russia's proposed reliance on the 
doctrine. 
114. See id.; see also EVANS, supra note 24, at 135 (discussing the invocation of the 
principle of self-defense under art. 51 with respect to India's invasion of East Pakistan in 
197 l in response to West Pakistan's suppression of Bengalis). 
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IV. THE INVOCATION OF R2P IN THE WAKE OF CYCLONE NARGIS IN 
MYANMAR 
The harder, more urgent question for this Article, however, is 
whether R2P could have been invoked to justify the proposed foreign 
intervention compelling delivery of aid to Myanmar. 
A. The Factual Background 
On May 2, 2008, tropical cyclone Nargis made landfall in 
Myanmar, also called Burma, and left a trail of destruction in its 
wake.115 The cyclone wreaked the greatest harm in Southern 
Myanmar, particularly in a region known as the Irrawaddy River 
delta.116 In the worst affected areas, ninety-five percent of people lost 
their homes and possessions. 111 While estimates vary, there is no 
denying the severe human and economic toll of the storm. The 
Myanmar government claims there are approximately 78,000 dead and 
56,000 missing, whereas outside observers believe the figure to be 
closer to 100,000.118 Additionally, the cyclone is said to have caused 
some $10 billion of damage. 119 
Almost from the outset, the Myanmar government began 
intercepting efforts to reach survivors.120 Only days after the storm 
passed, for example, military leaders in Myanmar seized a shipment of 
food from the United Nations and refused to allow its distribution by 
foreign aid workers.121 On one occasion a plane with aid was turned 
away because it also carried foreign aid workers and press.122 
Separately, a spokesperson for the World Food Program (WFP) stated 
that all the food aid and equipment that it had managed to transport to 
Myanmar had been confiscated. 123 He noted further that the delay and 
frustration the WFP experienced in Myanmar was "unprecedented in 
115. U.N. Office for the Coord ination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA}, Myanmar-
Cyclonc Nargis Situation Report No. 9 (2008), http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLink.Click. 
aspx?link=ocha&docld = I 089598 . 
116. UN Chief Announces Accord with Myanmar on Cyclone Aid, L.A. T IMES, May 
24, 2008, at A3. 
117. Seth Mydans et al., Myanmar Seizes UN Food for Cyclone Victims and Blocks 
Foreign Expens, N.Y. TIM ES, May 10, 2008, at AIO. 
118. Johnson, supra note I , at World I; UN Chief A1mounces Accord witl1 Myanmar 
on Cyclone Aid, supra note I 16. 
119. UN. ChiefArmouncesAccord with Myanmar on Cyclone Aid, supra note 116. 
120. See generally Mydans et al., supra note 117 (noting government initially blocked 
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modern humanitarian relief efforts."12' By one estimate, the lack of aid 
had left 2.5 million survivors vulnerable to hunger, exposure, and 
disease.m 
Myanmar's inability or unwillingness adequately to help the 
survivors has been traced to various causes. Most inunediately, the 
regime insisted on proceeding with a constitutional referendum that 
had previously been scheduled on May 10, 2008, although the voting 
ended up being postponed until May 24, 2008, in Yangon and the areas 
hardest hit by the cyclone.126 The purpose of the referendum was the 
official shifting of power to the military.121 Critics of the government 
assert that the logistical support required for a national election 
detracted from the resources available to aid victims.128 
Another explanation offered is that the areas hit hardest by the 
cyclone are occupied by ethnic minorities perceived as hostile by the 
military regime.129 These minorities occupy a part of the country rich 
in natural resources, and tension has long existed between them and 
the government, which for nearly thirty years has been trying 
systematically to relocate these tribal peoples to make way for access 
to the resources.130 It has been alleged that delaying aid to the ethnic 
victims serves as a back-door method for the forcible relocation r:11 
masse of those mi.norities.131 This theory, however, is difficult to 
corroborate independently. 
Also, it may not have helped matters that China allegedly 
declined to use its influence to pressure Myanmar into accepting aid. 
As Myanmar's largest trading partner and military supplier, China has 
obvious and significant influence over the Myanmar regime.132 Yet, 
while China itself has managed to deliver aid into Myanmar, it has 
reportedly opposed efforts to bring the issue before the UN. Security 
Council.133 It has also refused to pressure Myanmar to allow in aid 
124. Id 
125. UNChiefHe.1ds to Myanmar, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 2008, at 14. 
126. Voting Proceeds i11 Myanmar Despite Cyclone's Devastation, L.A. TIMES, May 
11, 2008, at A 11. 
127. Mydans ct al., s1pmnote 117. 
128. Id 
129. Tim Heinemann, Op-Ed., A Sinister Siw:ep: My,wnar Uses Cyclone To Push 
Out Ethnic Mi11odties, CBI. Trus., May 30, 2008, at C25; see also Johnson, supra note I, at 
World I (pointing out that many affected were members ofan ethnic minority). 
130. Heinemann , supnrnote 129. 
131. Id 
132. Simon Montlake, Bunna (Myanmar) Opens Door for Aid, But Remains Waiy, 
Ct!RJSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 27, 2008, at World 6. 
133 See Jeff Davis, Mymm1ar'!; Envoy Dismisses Calls for R2P, EMBASSY, May 21, 
2008, availableathttp: //embassymag .ca/page/view /.2008 .may.21.myanmar _envoy. 
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from Western countries. 134 Some analysts have speculated that China 
has been careful not to alienate Myanmar with an eye to the extensive 
business dealings between the two countries. 135 Additionally, the 
massive earthquake that devastated the Sichuan province of China on 
May 12, 2008 had preoccupied the govemment and diverted its 
attention from Myanmar. 136 
There have since been some encouraging developments in the 
situation. Most notably, prior to a summit of fifty donor nations, U.N. 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon traveled to Myanmar on May 23 and 
24, and extracted concessions from the regime to allow foreign aid 
workers into Myanmar, 1n although only a week later, U.S. Navy ships 
and aircraft carrying supplies were forced to abandon attempts to 
deliver the aid due to the repeated refosals of the Myanmar regime.m 
Aid did, however, reach the victims soon thereafter, and by July 24, the 
U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs was able to 
conclude that humanitarian organizations bad reached virtually aU 
cyclone-affected individuals with some relief assistance, although it 
stressed the challenge of systematically providing ongoing support, 
particularly to populations in remote areas.1w 
In surveying the situation, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
has refrained from calling it genocide, but did pointedly refer to the 
Myanmar government's refosal of aid as "criminal neglect." 140 
B The !11vocatio11 of R2P 
Just days after the cyclone passed, and after Myanmar made it 
clear it was not about to Jet aid into the country, the French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner stated that "[ w ]e are seeing at the United 
Nations if we can't implement the 'responsibility to protect,' given that 
food, boats and relief teams are there. and obtain a U.N. resolution 
which authorizes the delivery ( of aid) and imposes this on the Burmese 
134. Jason Leow, World News: Chi11a ls U!ged To Use influence with Junta, WAL L ST . 
.1.,May 12,2008,atAIO. 
135. Johnson, supn1note I, at World I. 
136. See Mont lake, supra note 132 (discussing China ·s ptiotities shifting to earthq uake 
in Sichuan). 
13 7. UN Chief Alwo1111ces Accord will, Mya11mar 011 Cyclone Ala, supm note 116. 
138. Eric Schmiu, Olltcs Accuses Myanmar of 'Criminal Negkct" Over Aid, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2008, at AS. 
139. The U.S. Agency for lnt'l Dev. (USAID), USAID Respond s to Cyclone Nar<Jjs, 
http://www.usaid.gov / locations /asia /countries/bunna/cyclone_nargis l (las t vis ited Oct. 3, 
2009). 
140. Schmitt , supm note 138. 
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govemment." 14 1 Consistent with this suggestion, the French U.N. 
Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert asked the Security Council to call 
for a humanitarian briefing and issue a statement urging greater 
cooperation. The request, however, was not acted upon after China, 
Vietnam, South Africa and Russia had argued during closed 
consultations against the Security Council getting involved.1• 2 
Not surprisingly, Myanmar has trenchantly opposed any such 
application ofR2P. Charge d'Affaires Muang Muang, Myanmar's top 
diplomat in Canada, described the French effort as a blatant 
politicization of a grave humanitarian crisis, and warned that it would 
set a "dangerous precedent." 14 1 He further disputed the applicability of 
R2P in this situation, noting that the doctrine "was aimed to prevent 
genocide, not for use in tin1es of natural disasters." 144 
The invocation of R2P in the wake of the cyclone precipitated a 
fierce debate on the question of the doctrine's application in Myanmar, 
and more generally, on its application to natural disasters. Critics who 
oppose relying on R2P in these circumstances point out that unlike the 
original formulation espoused by ICISS, the doctrine as articulated in 
the Summit Outcome Document applies only to mass atrocity crimes 
and does not explicitly encompass natural disasters. 14' They regard the 
omission as a deliberate rejection by the United Nations of the 
applicability of R2P to natural disasters, asserting that its use here is 
accordingly improper and further will only encourage reliance on the 
doctrine to justify all manner of humanitarian interventions.'"" In their 
view, the result would be to destroy the legitimacy of R2P, foreclosing 
its use in future crises that genuinely call for it.147 
In contrast, supporters of the use of R2P in the Myanmar crisis 
argue that parsing through such legal niceties in a situation where lives 
are at stake does not make moral sense, and that refraining from 
employing R2P simply because natural disasters are involved will in 
fact neuter the doctrine and turn it into a meaningless catchphrase. 14S 
141. See Parsons , supra note 2. 
142. Sceicl. 
143. SceDavi s,supronote 133. 
144. Id 
145. See discussion infhi Part VA.I. 
146. See discussion intro Part VA. I. 
147. Sec discussion infra Part VA. I., B; see a/so Thakur , supra note 8 ("[A]ny effort to 
invoke R2P formally in tl1e Security Council [without ihe assent of Myanmar 's Asian 
neighbors] would have the counter-productive effect of damaging R2P permanently .. . . "). 
148. See, e.g., Axworthy & Rock, supnt note 9 ("Whal is the moral distinction 
between closing the door of rescuing people from death by machete and closing the door of 
life-saving aid?'"). 
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While both sides make compelling arguments, the very premise 
of the exchange is fundamentally unsound, based as it is on the concept 
of natural disasters. To the extent that R2P applies, it does so because 
of the state's criminal failure to protect its citizens from harm in the 
wake of the natural disaster and not because of the deaths immediately 
caused by the natural disaster. Put differently, if Myanmar could 
reasonably, but did not, prevent the continuing large-scale loss of life 
following the cyclone, for example, by promptly allowing foreign aid 
into the country, then R2P is potentially applicable since such 
deliberate inaction is the cause of the harm at issue; plainly, no one is 
proposing to hold Myanmar accountable under R2P for any immediate 
harm caused by the cyclone or harm that could not othe1wise have 
been reasonably averted. 
Y. THE CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE RESPONSIBLUTY To 
PROTECT 
Properly reframed, the debate implicates concerns that go beyond 
those attending natural disasters specifically. Consistent with this 
realignment, this Article advocates what I call the "constructive 
interpretation" of R2P. Under this interpretation, R2P applies not just 
to a goverrunent's failure to protect its people from affirmatively 
perpetrated mass atrocities but also from harm based on omission 
where the government's failure to act also constitutes a crime against 
humanity under international Jaw. 
Reframed as such, the arguments raised on both sides of the table, 
whether legal or political, can now be answered within a cohesive and 
coherent framework based on the constructive interpretation of R2P. 
As set out below, this Part will analyze these various arguments and 
advance both a legal and political case for supporting that interpre-
tation. 
A. A Legal Case for the Constructive Interpretation of R2P 
1. The Scope of R2P as Defined and the Red Herring of "Natural 
Disaster" 
As set out in the Summit Outcome Document, R2P applies on its 
terms only to a state's failure to protect its populace from mass atrocity 
cnmes, i.e., "genocide , war crimes, ethnic cleansing , and crimes 
against humanity."149 Indeed, the United Nations' formulation is 
149. Summit Outcome Document , supra note 4, 139. 
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distinctly narrower than the original expression of the doctrine as 
formulated by the ICISS, which explicitly applies additionally to 
"overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state 
concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, 
and significant loss of life is occmring or threatened." 15-0 
As a result, some commentators believe that R2P is inapplicable 
here. The argument is that the narrowing of the scope of R2P for the 
Summit Outcome Document should be acknowledged as a conscious 
act to create consensus among skeptics of the original ICISS Report 
and thus to exclude natural disaster situations. 151 China has explicitly 
made the point that the Myanmar crisis should not come before the 
U.N. Security Council as an R2P issue given that it involved a natural 
disaster.' 52 ICISS member Ramesh Thakur, in his analysis of the 
applicability of R2P to Myanmar, concluded that the exclusion of the 
reference to natural disasters from the Summit Outcome Document 
clearly suggests that the doctrine was intended to be limited to the 
affirmative commission of atrocities and armed combat. 153 He 
believed that its back-door introduction here would undermine the 
fragile support for the doctrine "and damage R2P for other times when 
we will need it."154 Similarly, the U.N. Secretary-General's 2009 report 
on R2P asserted-without explana tion or supporting argument- that 
"[t]o try to extend [R2P] to cover other calamities, such as lllV/AIDS, 
climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine 
the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or 
operational utility."155 
However, as pointed out earlier, the entire discussion has been 
sidetracked by the unfortunate and misleading focus on the term 
"natural disasters." As a result, the arguments raised above fail 
sufficiently to recognize that R2P is implicated only to the extent the 
state could reasonably, but did not, halt the large-scale suffering of its 
people in the aftermath of the natural disaster. In that situation, the 
150. ICISS REPORT, supra note 5, para. 4.20; see also Davis, supra note 133. 
151. S,"t:: Thakur, supra note 8 (stating the exclusion of natural disasters should not be 
taken lightly); Nanda, supra note 18, at 372 (noting that the Smnmit Outcome Document 
reflects some states' resistance to give a blank check to the U.N. Security Council). 
152. See Leow, supra note 134 (noting the Chinese government'.5 statement that natural 
disasters should be handled bilaterally rather than through the U.N. Security Council). 
153 Thakur, supra note 8 (arguing d1at the placement of the phrase "crimes against 
humanity" after descriptions of war atrocities in the final U.N. formulation of R2P suggests 
that the phrase should be read in the context of armed combat and affirmative actions by 
governments). 
154. Davis, supra note 133 (quoting Thakur on same). 
155. S-G Report on R2P, supra note 3, para. lO(b). 
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state is also directly accountable for its intentional omission, and it is 
the state's deliberate failure to act- and not the natural disaster-- that 
is deemed the cause of the harm. When that failure to act may 
properly be described as a crime against humanity, R2P applies 
squarely to the situation. Thus, the question as to the applicability of 
R2P to the Myanmar situation turns on whether Myanmar's failure to 
help its population in the aftermath of the cyclone is a crime against 
humanity. 
ln examining this question, it is important to keep in mind that 
there are two distinct requirements that must be met in order for R2P 
to be invoked: (I) the relevant state must be failing to protect its 
populace and (2) as against one of the four specified mass atrocity 
crunes. 
As to the first requirement (failure to protect), the actor-or more 
descriptively, "nonactor"- has to be the state, whereas as to the second 
requirement (commission of underlying mass atrocity crime), the actor 
may be the state itself or a third party. Plainly, in the situation where 
the state is the perpetrator of an underlying mass atrocity crime against 
its own populace, thereby meeting the second requirement, the first 
requirement is necessarily met as well. AB such, if Myanmar has 
committed a crime against humanity with respect to its people, then it 
would necessarily have failed to protect its people against that mass 
atrocity, and R2P would come into play. 
That a state as opposed to individuals may commit an act 
described as "a crime under international law"- meaning that the act 
is attributable to the state--has been affirmed by the ICJ in the case of 
Bosnia v. Serbia. '51' The Court held there that the state parties, in 
assuming an obligation under the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to prevent genocide--wruch the 
Convention categorizes as "a crime under international law"- were 
necessarily "prohibit[ ed] ... from themselves committing genocide."151 
Such was the case even though the Convention "does not expressis 
156. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment , 2007 
I.CJ . 91, ,i 166 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/ 13685.pdf 
[hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia]; see also id. ,i 173 (noting with regard to the responsibility of 
states and individuals for internationally wrongful acts that "duality of responsibility 
continues to be a constant feature of international law''). Note that in determining that a state 
may commit genocide under the Convention, the ICJ was not also saying that the state would 
attract criminal responsibility as a result. Indeed it sidestepped the latter issue, and simply 
noted that the consequence of a state committin g genocide under the Convention was a 
breach of the state's responsibilities under international law. See 1d ,i,i 166-167, 170. 
157. ld 
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verbi's require States to refrain from themselves committing genocide" 
and even though concepts in the Convention, including those referring 
to complicity, "refer to well known categories of criminal law and, as 
such, appear particularly well adapted to the exercise of penal 
sanctions against individuals."158 This was because it would otherwise 
subvert the object of the Convention and further be 
paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far 
within their power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they 
have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts 
through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm 
control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under 
international law.159 
Likewise, having the responsibility to protect against mass atrocity 
crimes necessari ly means that states are ( capable of and) prohibited 
from themselves committing acts amounting to mass atrocity crimes, 
even though R2P is not phrased in those terms in the Summit Outcome 
Document and even if the mass atrocity crimes "appear particularly 
well adapted to the exercise of penal sanctions against individuals." 160 
2. Crimes Against Humanity by Omission 
As noted above, the Summit Outcome Document defines R2P as 
applicable inter alia to "crimes against humanity."1<'1 The concept of 
"crimes against humanity" is part of customary international law and 
has been codified in article 7(1) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) as follows: 
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any 
of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack; 
(a) Murder; 
158. Id 166-167. Article I of the Genocide Convention provides that "The 
Contracting Parties confirm that genocide ... is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and to punish." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide art. I, Dec. 9, 1948, I 02 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
159. fd1166. 
160. This is not to say that challenging problems may not arise concerning the 
application of concepts of criminal law ordinarily employed for individuals in determining 
the international responsibility of states that have apparently perpetrated such mass atrocities. 
For example, it may be difficu lt to determine whether particular co"'1uct of a state official is 
attributable to the state for purposes of determining state responsibility. Such issues may well 
be fodder for another article. I am more concerned in this Article, however, with laying out 
more generally the proper framework for analyzing the R2P doctrine . 
161. Summit Outcome Document, supra note 4, ml 138- 139. 
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(b) Extermination; ... 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health.162 
As reflected in article 7 (I), the elements of "crimes against humanity " 
can be divided into two categories: (I) general or chapeau elements as 
listed in the introductory language in article 7( 1) relating to "attack" 
and that are applicable to the various "acts," each of which may be the 
basis of a crime against humanity, and (2) mental (mens rea) and 
physical ( actus reus) elements of the relevant "act." 
a. The Chapeau Elements 
The chapeau elements are general requirements common to all 
the listed offenses and provide the context in which the offense must 
take place in order to qualify as a crime against humanity. In essence, 
there must be (1) an attack that is (2) widespread or systematic, 
(3) directed against a civilian population , and (4) knowledge on the 
part of the perpetrator of the attack. 163 
As defined in article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, an '"(a]ttack 
directed against any civilian population' means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 
against any civilian population , pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such attack."164 Note , however, that 
the concept of "attack" is not the same as that employed in the law of 
war crimes and does not have to involve armed conflict or the use of 
162. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 2 187 
U.N.T.S. 90. The concept of "crimes against humanity" has long been the subject of various 
instruments of international criminal law, starting with the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which defined crimes against humanity as "murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population." Chartero f the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c),A ug. 8, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. Since Nuremberg, a number of international instruments have 
catalogued crimes against humanity. including the statutes governing international criminal 
courts. For example, the statutes of the .ICTY and !CTR explicitly include imprisonment, 
torture, and rape among "other inhumane acts." Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 5, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (May 25, 1993 ); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art . 3, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(Nov. 8, 1994). 
163. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 162, art. 7( 1). 
164. Id art. 7(2)(a). 
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armed force. 165 Rather, an attack encompasses any mistreatment of the 
civilian population 166 and can consist of nonviolent acts, such as 
instituting apartheid or applying pressure on the population to act in a 
particular way. 167 
Additionally, while the policy to commit such attack has been 
read to require the state or organization actively to promote or 
encourage such an attack, various International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cases have, in fact, rejected the idea that 
there even is a policy requirement for crimes against humanity.'"" In 
any event, where required, such a policy may exceptionally be 
implemented by a deliberate failure to take action that consciously 
seeks to encourage such attacks or the result.169 
Taken together, Myanmar's actions, or the lack thereof, could 
potentially meet all the chapeau requirements: Myanmar's failure to 
help its citizens and refusal to allow for the delivery of aid could be 
characterized as mistreatment of the population, and therefore an 
"attack" under article 7(1) since it is widespread and systematic in that 
it affects a broad swath of the population, against which it is directed, 
and Myanmar is clearly aware of its (in)action. 
b. The Mental and Physical Elements of Underlying "Acts" 
In addition to the chapeau requirements, crimes against humanity 
are defined additionally to include the mental and physical elements of 
the relevant "act." Two of the acts listed in article 7(1) are potentially 
relevant to the Myarunar situation: murder and "other inhumane 
acts.'' 110 
While murder is a familiar concept, the latter is less so, and a 
brief introduction to what constitutes "inhumane acts" is in order here. 
"Crimes against humanity" has long been the subject of various 
165. See International Criminal Court (ICC), The JCC Elements of Crimes for War 
Crimes, art. 7, al 116, Crimes Against Humanity, lntroducrion, para. 3, !CC Doc. ASPlll/3 
(2008) (explaining that "[t]he acts need not constitute a military attack"). 
166. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/ 1-A, Appeal Judgement, 
para. 86 (Jw1e 12, 2002). 
167. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. fCTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, para. 582 (Sept. 
2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgement, parn. 70 (Dec. 6, 
1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Judgement, para. 205 (Jan. 27, 
2000). 
168. See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE 197- 98 (2007). • 
169. Sec ICC, supra note 165, at I 16 n .6. 
170. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 162, art. 7(1 )(a), 
(k). 
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instruments of international criminal law. Critically, many of these 
instruments define crimes against humanity similarly to include a 
residual category of"inhumane acts." An early example is the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which defined 
crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population."111 Since Nuremberg, a number of other statutes governing 
international criminal courts have likewise cataloged crimes against 
humanity, including the statutes of the ICTY and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which list imprisonment, 
torture, and rape among "other inhumane acts."112 Most recently, the 
agreement between the United Nations and the Cambodian 
government establishing the Khmer Rouge war crimes tribunal has 
followed suit by essentially adopting the definition of "crimes against 
humanity" in the Rome Statute.173 
The rationale for including this catch-all provision is to ensure 
that instances of inhuman behavior that do not neatly fall under other 
existing categories of crimes against humanity will not escape 
criminalization, nor their perpetrators accountability.174 This, however, 
does not mean a blank check for prosecutors, since the provision is 
subject to strict conditions concerning the gravity of the inhuman 
conduct. In accordance with ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence, "other 
inhumane acts" include only those crimes that are not otherwise 
specified but are of comparable gravity. 115 
1. Mental Elements of the Underlying "Acts" 
Murder in this context has been defined as an intentional killing 
of a human being resulting from an unlawful act or omission of the 
perpetrator.116 While the mental element, as a rule, is the intent to kill 
the victim, "a lesser mental element is required by case law: it is 
171. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 162, art. 6( c ). 
172. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra 
note 162, art. 5; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 162, 
art. 3. 
173. G.A. Res. 57/2288, art. 9, Annex , U.N. Doc. A/RES /57/228 B (May 22, 2003). 
174. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AW l 14 (2d ed. 2008). 
175. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgement , para. 152 
(Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-l-T , Trial 
Judgement , paras. 149, 150-51, 154 (May 21 , 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No . ICTR-
96-4-T, Trial Judgment, para. 585 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-
25-T, Trial Judgment, para. 130 (Mar. 15, 2002). 
176. A.kayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 589; see also ICC Elements of the 
Crimes, supra note 165,art. 7(l)(a) . 
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sufficient for the perpetrator 'to cause the victim serious injury with 
reckless disregard for human life.'"m 
The mental element of "other inhumane acts" is likewise one of 
intentionality, except that it consists of the intention to inflict serious 
physical or mental suffering or to commit a serious attack upon the 
human dignity of the victim, or where the perpetrator knew that its act 
or omission was likely to cause serious physical or mental suffering or 
a serious attack upon human dignity.'78 
It is arguable that the Myanmar situation meets the mental 
element of murder described above. In choosing not to help its 
population by barring aid, Myarunar caused serious injury to its 
citizens in reckless disregard of human life. The mental element of 
"other inhumane acts" is also met under the circmnstances for the 
same reasons, it being clear that any failure to help its people would 
cause severe physical and mental suffering. 
11. Physical Elements of the Underlying "Acts" 
Importantly, for our purposes, the physical element ( actus reus) of 
both murder and "other inhumane acts" has been expressly defined by 
various international courts to include both acts and omissions. 
Murder, for example, has been defined as an intentional killing of a 
human being that "resulted from an tmlawful act or omissiod' of the 
perpetrator.119 Similarly, the crime of inhumane acts has been defined 
to consist of "an act or on11ss1on of similar seriousness to the other acts 
enumerated ... [that] caused serious mental or physical suffering or 
injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity; and ... was 
performed intentionally by the accused."tsu 
Furthermore, there is ICTR jurisprudence that has explicitly 
recognized an omission to be the basis of a finding of a "crime against 
humanity'' (with the underlying "act" being one of "extermination") 
under the ICTR statute. The case of Prosecutor v. Vincent Rutaganira 
involved a defendant, Vincent Rutaganira, who had served as 
conseiller of the Mubuga sector, Gishyita Commune, Kibuye 
177. CASSESE, supra note 174, at 109 (citations omitted); see also Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgement, para. 560 (Jan. 14, 2000) ; A.kaycsu, Case 
No. TCTR-96-4-T, para. 589. 
178. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, para. 154; Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, parn. 
132. " 
179. A.kayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 589 {emphasis added); see al.so ICC, 
supranore 165, at art. 7(l)(a). 
180. Galic, Case No . IT-98-29-T, para. 152 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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Prefecture in Rwanda181 from 1985 to 1994.182 The various charges 
brought against Rutaganira centered on a massacre in April 1994 of 
thousands of Tutsi who had sought refuge in a church in Mubuga. 183 
Prior to the attacks, Rutaganira witnessed the attackers assembling, but 
despite his position, had failed to take any action to protect the Tutsi.184 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, however, Rutaganira pied to and was 
found guilty of only one count: "crime against humanity 
(extermination) ... for having aided and abetted the commission of the 
said crime by omissio11."185 
Significantly, 
in his plea agreement, Rutaganira admitted only to omissions; that is, he 
denied both ordering the attack on the church and participating in the 
attack, the charges that had formed the basis for his original indictment. 
Rather, he admitted only that he was aware that Tutsi civilians had 
gathered in the church, that he was aware that assailants were gathering 
near the church before the attack took place, and that 'despite the fact 
that he was conseillerof Mubuga secteurhe failed to protect the Tutsi 
who had sought refuge' in the church."186 
In finding that Rutaganira participated in a crime against 
humanity by omission, the trial chamber considered whether the 
defendant had the requisite actus reus and me11S rea.181 In the context 
of an omission, the actus reus was determined by making three 
mqumes: 
(i) Did the Accused have the power to act and chose not to exercise 
it? 
(ii) Did the Accused have authority over the principal actors to 
prevent them from committing the crime and chose not to use it? 
(m) Did the Accused have the legal duty to act and failed to so act?188 
On the first two questions, the chamber determined that Rutaganira 
had influence as conseiller and further "wielded moral authority" over 
the principal actors, which he had failed to exercise to prevent the 
181. "Rwanda is divided into eleven prefectures, and each of these prefectures is 
further divided into communes, which are themselves divided into sectors." Nancy Amoury 
Combs, Procunng Gwlty Pleas for lntemational Crimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence 
Discow1ts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 111 n.207 (2006). 
182. Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. JCTR-95- lC-T, Judgement Summary, para. 
20 (Mar. 14, 2005). 
183. ldpara.21. 
184. Id para. 22. 
185. Id para. 36, verdict (emphasis added) . 
186. Combs, supra note 181, at 111-12. 
187. Rutaganira, Case No. JCTR-95-l C-T, Summary para. 27. 
I 88. Id para. 28. 
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attacks.'~9 As to the third question, the chamber found that "under 
international law, Vincent Rutaganira had a duty to act, as a State 
employee, to protect the population of his secteur."100 Accordingly, the 
chamber concluded that Rutaganira had the requisite actus reus and 
had "participated by omission" during the massacre at Mubuga 
church. The chamber also determined that he had the requisite mens 
rea in that he knew of the attacks and further knew that his inaction 
contributed to the harm.191 
By extension, whether a state has the requisite actus reus to 
support a finding of a crime against humanity by omission can be 
determined by the following three questions: 
(i) Did the state have the power to act and choose not to exercise that 
power? 
(ii) Did the state have the ability to prevent the harm and choose not 
to use it? 
(iii) Did the State have the legal duty to act and fail so to act? 
Accordingly, assuming the relevant mens rea is met, where a state has 
the power to act and chooses not to exercise that power to protect its 
population from "great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health," it would be committing "a crime against humanity 
... by omission" if the action would have prevented the harm since a 
state evidently has the legal duty under international law to protect its 
population from such harm.192 As such, in the event that the chapeau 
elements are also met, R2P is applicable when a state fails to protect its 
people from grave harm by omission where the failure to act 
constitutes a crime against humanity, including, potentially, where the 
omission involves natural disasters like cyclone Nargis. 
One may argue that the situations are nonetheless distinguishable 
when one considers the actual instrument of harm. In Rutaganira, the 
victims were harmed by physical attacks constituting affirmative 
criminal acts, whereas the victims in Myanmar were harmed by the 
failure to provide food and water, properly characterized again as 
om1ss1ons. Such an argument, however, proves too much. It 
confounds reason to reject such a distinction with respect to the 
defendant/state only to resurrect it again with regard to the secondary 
189. Id para. 30. 
190. Id. para. 31. The tribunal additionally fotmd that Rutaganira was required to 
render assistance to persons in danger, pursuant to Section 256 of the Rwandan penal code. 
See id. 
191. Id. para. 28. 
l 92. Id para. 36; ICC, sup1,rnote 165, art. 7(1 )(k). 
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question of the mechanics of harm. The proper focus in determining 
the existence of a crime against humanity, as Rutaganira reflects, 
should be on whether the defendant/state and not any third party actors 
had the requisite actus reus, which encompasses omissions, and mens 
rea, which includes the knowledge that harm would result from 
deliberate inaction. '93 
Indeed, if anything, the reverse is true: a situation involving an 
omission-based instrument of harm may well be easier and safer to 
neutralize, thereby making it less-not more-justifiable for the state 
to have failed to correct its omission, as opposed to dealing with the 
commission of violence by third parties. For instance, it would have 
been comparatively less risky for Myanmar to allow in the foreign aid 
than it would have been for Rutaganira to confront the attackers, or for 
a state government to head off attacks by a rogue militia on its civilian 
population, to draw a more equivalent example. Yet, while few would 
dispute that the government of Sudan has manifestly failed to protect 
its people in Darfur from crimes against humanity, even if one were to 
assume that the Janjaweed was independently and exclusively 
responsible for the violence, the same is not true with respect to the 
Myanmar government. 
Moreover, it makes little logical or moral sense to maintain the 
distinction, particularly under these circumstances, when the end result 
is the same: "great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health." 194 Simply put, a hundred lives lost, whether to 
cyclones or ethnic cleansing, is a hundred lives lost. 
c. The Slippery Slope Argument 
Separately, detractors of R2P may charge that expanding the 
scope ofR2P to include a situation like that in Myanmar is an exercise 
on a slippery slope that will potentially sweep all manner of threats to 
human security, including environmental disasters and pandemic 
threats within the scope of R2P.195 Such an argument, however, fails to 
193. This situation should not be confused with the distinct question of detennining 
the applicability of R2P in a situation where the underling mass atrocity crime is committed 
by a third party rather than the state; in the latter situation, the inquiry does turn on and 
therefore focuses on the mens rea of the third party committing the crime. See supra Part 
VA.I. 
194. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
195. Cf Gareth Evans, President, lnt'l Crisis Group, The Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P): Progress, Empty Promise or a License for 'Humanitarian Intervention,' Address to 
SEF Symposium 2007 (Nov. 30, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. 
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take into account the inherent safeguards in the definition of R2P. 
First, as discussed above,19(, the constructive interpretation advocated 
here extends only to those situations involving the intentional failure to 
act to prevent grievous harm to a population. Under the circumstances 
described above, it is only when a state can but fails to protect its 
people, and where such deliberate and inhumane inaction is the cause 
of the harm, that R2P may properly be invoked.191 
A second safeguard exists in the definition of the types of harm 
that trigger R2P, which are "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity."198 As the definition and its provenance 
reflect, R2P is concerned both with the scale of the harm and the fact 
that the harm be the result of atrocities, hence the general shorthand 
"mass atrocities" for the list of crimes above.199 Plainly, isolated 
incidents of human rights abuses or individual casualties claimed by 
environmental hazards, for example, cannot be the basis for invoking 
R2P. There needs to be a confluence of both elements before R2P can 
be relied upon. There is, however, no explicit reference to these 
elements in the doctrine as such, much less guidance on how we might 
determine whether both are present in an R2P context. This Article 
proposes in response that one way to make such a determination that 
would accommodate concerns about a constructive interpretation of 
R2P would be to treat the elements as factors on a sliding scale: The 
greater the scale of suffering, the less we would require in terms of the 
"perfect" crime, and vice versa. Pursuant to such a test, R2P would 
not be invoked in a situation involving omission-based harm unless the 
scale of the harm is significant. Even under this test, the Myanmar 
situation would readily qualify for R2P protection. Regardless of how 
one makes that determination, the need for both elements to be present 
for the operation of R2P serves as yet another moderating control on 
the scope of its application. 
Further, quite apart from the strictures placed on the scope of 
R2P by its definition, the doctrine is also reined in by its mode of 
operation. As articulated in the Summit Outcome Document , a 
response under R2P must be coordinated by the U.N. or if the response 
cfm?id=5 l 90&1= I ( discussing the "misunderstanding" that R2P applies "linguistically" and 
therefore legally to any global crisis). 
I 96. See supra Part m.A-8 . 
197. SeesupraPartill.A-B. 
198. See supra Part 11.C. 
199. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 24, at 11 (employing the expressions "mass 
atrocities" to refer to "genocide , war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against hwnanity "). 
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involves the use of force, by the Security Council;200 R2P does not 
authorize unilateral action. As such, the doctrine effectively requires 
international consensus on the question of whether R2P applies to any 
particular case. Any attempt to invoke R2P in a situation that departs 
from what the international community understands to fall within its 
scope within the bounds of customary international law will face a 
considerable uphill battle. 
It should be borne in mind again that the full range of responses 
short of the use of force is available- and indeed must be 
considered- to meet an R2P situation. For this reason, fears that the 
doctrine would be employed in contexts that do not involve armed 
violence as a pretext for the indiscriminate use of force are misplaced 
because many such situations will often not permit the use of force on 
an informed application of R2P. Take, for instance, the potential 
application ofR2P to HIV/AIDS or climate change, which is cited as a 
self-evident illustration of the slippery slope problem. 201 Because both 
these situations are comparatively slow-moving (and in the case with 
HIV I AIDS, potentially complicated by thorny questions concerning 
individual volition), it is difficult to see how R2P would justify the 
external use of force in the ordinary situation. Rather, the more likely 
candidates in terms of an appropriate response could be reliance on 
diplomatic efforts or trade and other economic incentives or sanctions. 
These alternative responses may well be available outside R2P, in 
which case, there would be little reason to look to R2P, which is a very 
different proposition than asserting that R2P has no application to 
issues like HIV I AIDS and climate change. The question of whether 
R2P applies and what response it justifies must be answered by 
considering systematically whether there exists a mass atrocity crime 
under the circumstances, and if so, whether the state has failed to 
protect against it. That is, as the above discussion would suggest, R2P 
could well apply in a situation involving HIV/AIDS or climate change 
or other situations not involving armed violence, where the doctrine's 
various elements are met, but the use of force will only exceptionally 
be a justified response. 
200 . See supra Part 11.C. 
20 l . Cf EVANS, supra note 24 , at 55 (noting the "extreme " view of those who see R2P 
"as a way of refening to most of the world's ills, from climate change to HIV/AIDS"); S-G 
Report on R2P, supra note 3, para . IO(b) ("To try to extend [R2PJ to cover other calamities , 
such as HIV/AIDS , climate change or the response to natural disasters , would undermine the 
2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility."). 
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Further, because these various safeguards are built into R2P, they 
will operate in any informed application of the doctrine at all points on 
the proverbial slippery slope, and not just to issues that appear to be on 
the far end of the incline, like IUV/AJDs and climate change. 
Consider a different example closer to home both figuratively and 
literally, namely Hurricane Katrina. One of the largest natural disasters 
in the history of this country,202 Hurricane Katrina claimed over 1300 
lives and inflicted at least $80 billion worth of damage.20) It is well 
documented that the failure of government at all levels- local, state 
and federal-to anticipate and respond effectively to the disaster 
exacerbated matters on the ground, resulting in "preventable deaths, 
great suffering, and further delays in relief."i04 There are thus obvious 
if grim parallels between Hurricane Katrina and Cyclone Nargis. 
However, a finding that Myanmar's inaction would justify foreign 
military intervention does not necessarily warrant the same in the 
United States in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Unlike Myanmar, 
the United States-s urprised as it was to find itself in the positionzos_ 
was reportedly accepting aid quickly and, with a few exceptions, from 
all corners of the globe.106 Such aid apparently included the 
202. Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: America Responds to the 
Katrina Disaster (Sept. 3, 2005), OVllllab/e at http://georgewb ush-whitehou se.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/09/20050903-3 .html. 
203. Nat'! Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Noteworthy Records oftbe 2005 Atlantic 
Hurricane Season, available at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2005/s2540b.htm (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
204. SELECT BIPARTISAN C0\.1M. TO INV ESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR ANO RESPONSE 
TO HURRJCANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
BlPARTISAN COMMlTTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND REsPONSE TO HURRICANE 
KATRINA 2 (Comm. Print 2006), avmloblc at http ://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinarepor t/ 
mainrcport .pdf 
205. Juan Forero & Steven R. Weisman, US. Allies. and Others, Send Offers of" 
Assistance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, avaJlable at http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2005 /09104/ 
intemational/america s/04o ffers.html (noting that the United States appeared initially 
unprepared for the outpouring of aid); Barbara Slavin, Some Foreign Attempt to Send US. 
Aid Stymied USATODAY.com, Sept. 7, 2005. http://www.usatoday.com/newsfworld/2005-
09-07-katrina-world_.x.htm (quoting Natalie Loiseau, press counselor at the French Embassy 
in Washington, D.C.. as observing that "this is the first time the United States has [had] to 
welcome foreign aid, so no one has had this job (of facilitating foreign aid)"). 
206. Farah Stockman, US. Accepts Nearly $1B in Foreign Aid, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
8, 2005, avaJlable at http://www.boston.com/news/weather /a rticles/2005/09/08/us_accepts_ 
ncarly_lb_i n_ foreign_aid/ (reporting that the "State Department has announced that it has 
accepted nearly a billion dollars in pledges of foreign aid following Hurricane Katrina" and 
that the "US government immediately accepted all cash do,iations"); A Foreign Aid Twist: 
US. Gets, OtheFS Give, USATODAY.com, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/newsf 
opinion/cditorials/2005-09-06-US-aid_x.hnn (noting Harry Thomas , the State Department 
official in charge of coordinating foreign offers, had reported that Katrina had triggered offers 
of aid from 95 nations, but that only one offer, of20 million barrels of oil from Iran, had been 
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deployment of foreign military vehicles and personnel in U.S. 
territory.20' As such, the United State's receptivity towards assistance 
would neutralize the need for the use of force, which is available under 
R2P only as a last resort. Again, it is not that R2P could not apply to 
the Hurricane Katrina situation-it may do so-but rather that the 
proper application of the doctrine will not authorize foreign military 
intervention under these circumstances. 
In sum, the slippery slope problem as conceived by the critics of 
R2P is unlikely to present itself in practice and cannot begin to bear the 
weight that they would place thereon in opposing the constructive 
interpretation of the doctrine. 
B A Political Case for the Constructive !11terpretation f R2P 
Even otherwise ardent proponents of R2P have concluded that 
R2P is not potentially applicable in the Myanmar crisis, and thus have 
impliedly rejected the constructive interpretation of the doctrine.208 
One argument often advanced is that to do so risks resurrecting the 
global North-South split over the troubled concept of "humanitarian 
intervention" that R2P had assiduously avoided, and that expanding 
the doctrine as such could have the perverse effect of weakening 
support for tackling the Rwanda crisis of tomorrow.209 
However, it bears emphasizing that the constructive interpretation 
of R2P is based on and operates within the doctrine as defined in the 
Summit Outcome Document. Because the constructive interpretation 
of R2P is also grounded in prevailing international criminal 
jurisprudence, there is no need to recognize natural disaster situations 
or any particular context involving harm by omission as a new and 
independent basis for invoking R2P. Rather, any situation involving 
rebuffed because it was conditioned on the United States lifting economic sanctions) . Sec 
also Mary Mmray, K1t11i1a Aid from Cuba? No Thanks. Says US., MSNBC.com, Sept. 14, 
2005, hnp:/ /msnbc.msn.eom/id/9311876 (noting that the United States had refused help from 
Cuba's medical brigade because of what it noted as a "robus t response from the American 
medical community"). But see John Solomon & Spencer S. Hsu, Most K,1tni1a Aid Ii-om 
OversettS Hi'nL Unclaimed, WASfl. POST, Apr. 29, 2007. available at htlp://www.washington 
pos1.comlwp-dyn/content/a1iiclc/2007/04/28/AR200704280J ll3.html (report ing that of rhe 
S 126 million in foreign aid that was received, the government had distributed only about half 
of it by February 2006). 
207. See Slavin, supra note 205 (noting that a Mexican army convoy and a navy ship 
were bound for Texas carrying food, blankets , doctors and nurses, that Canada had sent 
planes. helicopters and ships, and 40 divers to Florida where they had begun to check levees 
and dikes in southern Louisiana, and that two French planes carrying tents, tarps , food and 
emergency personnel had landed in Little Rock and another was due in Alabama). 
208. See, e.g., Thakur, supra note 8. 
209. Davis, supra note 133 (quoting Thakur. supra note 8). 
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harm by omission, including natural disaster situations, that warrants 
intervention already falls within a self-defined basis for the invocation 
of R2P, namely the failure of a government to protect its population 
against a crime against humanity. The fact that the constructive 
interpretation stays faithful to its definition should modulate any 
concerns about the potential abuse of the doctrine. 
Another related argument offered to justify limiting the use of 
R2P is that the tenuous nature of the hard-earned consensus behind 
R2P suggests it should be relied upon sparingly and only for the most 
extreme situations. In other words, we should not squander precious 
political capital, but save R2P for the truly monumental crises on pain 
of its evisceration. 
Such a rationale is less than convincing, however, given the 
unfavorable outcome thus far of the United Nations ' intervention in 
Darfur, as discussed above.210 The result---0r more accurately, the lack 
thereof- is particularly telling since the Darfur crisis is widely 
regarded as the classic test case for R2P.2 11 That such a dire situation, 
one that not only fits the bill but in which the Security Council has 
repeatedly invoked R2P, should fail to bring about a justified and 
justifiable military response casts substantial doubt on whether the 
approach of limiting R2P to those situations that call clearly for it 
would, in fact, consolidate and strengthen the doctrine. Instead, such a 
seemingly stark and all-or-nothing approach makes its use appear 
prohibitive and discourages actual reliance on the doctrine. 
Apologists for the current and limited application of R2P in 
Darfur may argue that its implementation there was a complex exercise 
in reaction that not only utilizes the entire machinery of R2P (and not 
just its military applications), but is also consistent with the principle 
that all nonmilitary options be considered before resorting to the use of 
force. Yet, some 200,000 civilians had already been killed when the 
U.N. Security Council invoked R2P for the first time in the Darfur 
crisis on May 16, 2006, in passing Resolution 1679.2 12 The sheer scale 
of the ongoing violence should have left little doubt that anything short 
of a military intervention would not halt the carnage.213 Sure enough, 
2 10. Seediscussion supm Part 11.D. 
2 11. See discussion supra Part 11.D. 
2 12. See S.C. Res. 1679, supm note 67, para. 3; The Secretary-General, Report ofli1e 
Secretary-General on Darfi.Jr, para. 3, delivered to t'1e Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2006/591 (July 28, 2006) (estimating that over 200,000 civilians had been killed as of July, 
2006). 
213. Gareth Evans, who was co-chair of ICISS, believed the global response to the 
crisis in Darfur to be inadequate, noting that members of the U.N. Security Council are "all 
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some three years, four UN. Security Council resolutions invoking R2P, 
and an additional 100,000 lives later,214 a definitive resolution 
continues to appear elusive. 
In contrast, a better approach to adopt for the purposes of 
building confidence in and ultimately consolidating R2P may be an 
incrementalist one that allows for a less extreme yet visible and 
effective application of R2P. Interpreting R2P constructively so as to 
extend its reach to situations involving an omission-based intentional 
failure to act could lend itself to that approach. To the extent such 
situations call for less than a full military response-and it is 
conceivable that many such situations will do so by virtue of the nature 
of omissions- the international connnunity may more readily rally 
around the particular application of R2P. 
For example, shortly after Cyclone Nargis passed, the director of 
the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance asserted that the United 
States was considering air-dropping food aid and other relief supplies 
in the face of the junta's resistance.215 Because an air drop would have 
involved an invasion of sovereign air space, R2P would still be 
required in the event to justify the effort.116 Notwithstanding, an air 
drop is potentially less confrontational than sending in ground troops 
bearing both aid and arms. This is presumably why air drops were 
considered despite the fact that they are "not the most efficient manner 
in tern1s of providing relief assistance."211 For the same reasons, the 
international community may be more open to the application of R2P, 
here, as a measure short of a full military response may yet be a 
comparatively effective option under these circumstances, and the 
potential political cost should intervention tum out to be a mistake 
would also be reduced accordingly. 
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The idea is that such a graduated approach would acculturate the 
international community to the concept of R2P so that it will, in fact, 
be prepared to respond with force when the next Rwanda or 
Srebrenica, or Darfur for that matter, presents itself. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In reconfiguring the terms of the debate, the constructive 
interpretation of R2P not only moves the discussion beyond the 
impasse created by the reference to natural disasters; it 
reconceptualizes R2P by placing the responsibility on the international 
community to respond not just to a government's failure to protect its 
people from the affirmative commission of mass atrocities, but also 
from large-scale harm based on omission where the failure to act also 
constitutes a crime against humanity under international law. 
Cast in these terms, R2P would plainly not be limited to 
situations involving natural disasters with respect to omission-based 
intentional failures. Rather, R2P would apply to any scenario that 
implicates such failures, which could just as well play out in the 
context of environmental disasters or global pandemics, for instance. 
While the knee-jerk reaction might be to raise the perennial slippery 
slope argument, that potential objection is met by the fact that 
safeguards inherent in both the doctrine's definition and modus 
operandi will constrain the application ofR2P accordingly. 
As against the perceived risks of adopting the constructive 
interpretation of R2P, the distinct benefits would include a resulting 
analytical framework that gives R2P greater internal consistency-not 
least because it is in step with prevailing international criminal 
jurisprudence- as well as moral credence. Additionally, as a political 
matter, the fact that the constructive interpretation stays true to its 
definition should allay concerns about the potential for abusing the 
doctrine. Moreover, adopting the constructive interpretation may 
better foster international support for the doctrine to the extent it 
allows for an incrementalist approach built on effective and visible 
responses that, nonetheless, fall short of the categorical use of force. 
Finally, it bears emphasis that R2P is at least as much at risk of being 
diminished from underuse as it is from overuse. As things stand with 
the experience in Darfur, however, the former is proving to be the more 
formidable danger. 
